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Abstract
Part I analyzes the decision of a U.S. bankruptcy court in Springer Penguin that stayed an in-
ternational arbitration proceeding. Part II examines the Tribunal’s denial of the stay in the Behring
award. Part III suggests that the Tribunal’s reasoning in deying applicability of the stay is consis-
tent with recent U.S. policy favoring international arbitration of commercial disputes. This Note
concludes that the interests involved in fostering international commercial arbitration mandate
that once an arbitration clause is found to be enforceable, the arbitration should not be stayed by a
petition in a U.S. bankruptcy court.
AUTHORITY OF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
COURTS TO STAY INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
When a United States party files for bankruptcy all pend-
ing actions in which it is involved are stayed pursuant to the
United States Bankruptcy Code' (the "Code"). This automatic
stay vests exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor's financial af-
fairs in the bankruptcy court.2 There is no clear authority,
however, as to whether a petition for bankruptcy by a U.S.
party to an international arbitration stays the arbitration pro-
ceeding.' The United States Supreme Court, recognizing the
importance of arbitration to international commerce, has held
that international arbitration agreements are to be enforced
even if the underlying claim involves a matter of significant do-
mestic policy. 4 However, in In re Springer-Penguin,5 a U.S. bank-
ruptcy court recently granted an order staying a foreign arbi-
tration proceeding that was commenced before the U.S. debtor
filed for bankruptcy.' In contrast, in Behring International, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic Iranian Air Force,7 the Iran-United States Claims
1. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
3. Enforcement of international arbitration agreements and awards. is regulated
by Article II of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 3 (acceded to by U.S. Sept. 1, 1970, entered into force Dec. 29, 1970) [here-
inafter Convention] (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982) [hereinafter Arbitration
Act or Arbitration Statutes]). Article II provides for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements by referring the parties to arbitration whenever a claim arises and they
have agreed to arbitrate. The article contains no specific reference to the event of a
petition in bankruptcy by one of the arbitrating parties, or any other public policy
exception. Convention, supra, art. II, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2519, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, at 3,
330 U.N.T.S. 3, 38-40.
Nor does the automatic stay provision indicate that it applies to international
arbitration. The legislative history of 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987)
indicates that "[a]ll proceedings are stayed, including arbitation." S. REP No. 989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. i, 50 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT], reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5836. However, no distinction is drawn between do-
mestic and international arbitration. Id.
4. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrylser-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985); infra notes 84-97 and accompanying text.
5. 74 Bankr. 879 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
6. Id. at 885.
7. No. ITM/ITL 52-382-3, slip op. (Iran-United States Claims TribunalJune 21,
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Tribunal ("Tribunal") refused to stay its proceedings after the
U.S. claimant filed for bankruptcy.8
This Note argues that assertion of jurisdiction by the
bankruptcy court in the context of international arbitration
would sabotage the intention of the parties who choose arbi-
tration as an alternative means of dispute resolution. Part I
analyzes the decision of a U.S. bankruptcy court in Springer Pen-
guin that stayed an international arbitration proceeding. Part
II examines the Tribunal's denial of the stay in the Behring
award. Part III suggests that the Tribunal's reasoning in deny-
ing applicability of the stay is consistent with recent U.S. policy
favoring international arbitration of commercial disputes.
This Note concludes that the interests involved in fostering in-
ternational commercial arbitration mandate that once an arbi-
tration clause is found to be enforceable, the arbitration
should not be stayed by a petition in a U.S. bankruptcy court.
I. THE SPRINGER-PENGUIN CASE
The conflict between U.S. bankruptcy policies and the fed-
eral policy favoring international arbitration recently was ad-
dressed by a U.S. bankruptcy court in In re Springer-Penguin.
The case involved the bankruptcy court's power to stay an arbi-
tration proceeding between Springer-Penguin, a New York
office-furniture manufacturer, and Jugoexport-Beograd
("Jugo"), a Yugoslavian office-products exporter, following
Springer-Penguin's filing of a petition under Chapter 11 of the
Code.9
At issue was whether the Code's provisions, which man-
date that all claims against the debtor in a Title 11 case be de-
termined under the aegis of the bankruptcy court, includes ar-
bitral claims between a U.S. party and a foreign party.' ° The
1985) [hereinafter Behring] (on file with the offices of the Fordham International Law
Journal).
8. Behring, supra note 7, at 29.
9. Springer-Penguin, 74 Bankr. at 880-81. Technically, Springer-Penguin lost the
benefit of the automatic stay pursuant to II U.S.C. § 362(e) (Supp. III 1985) when it
stipulated to adjourn a hearing for relief from the stay beyond thirty days from the
request for such relief without obtaining consent from Jugo, or an order from the
court. Springer-Penguin, therefore, sought to obtain a stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a) (Supp. III 1985), which grants the bankruptcy court broad equitable powers
to protect its jurisdiction. Springer-Penguin, 74 Bankr. at 881.
10. Springer-Penguin, 74 Bankr. at 882.
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bankruptcy court held that, although there is a strong federal
policy favoring international arbitration, this policy is of secon-
dary importance when compared to the policies embodied in
the Code.'1
A. The Springer-Penguin Decision: Bankruptcy Policies Override
International Arbitration Policies
The Springer-Penguin court conceded that the arbitration
clause was valid and enforceable and that there was "no ques-
tion" as to its effect notwithstanding the bankruptcy petition.' 2
However, the court reasoned that the strong federal policy of
"prompt, fair and efficient administration" embodied in the
Code modified the parties contractual obligations to arbi-
trate.'3 Therefore, the court stayed the arbitration proceed-
ing.1
4
The court in Springer-Penguin distinguished the case from
Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., in which the Second Circuit en-
forced an award made by a Japanese arbitration panel despite a
U.S. bankruptcy referee's order staying the arbitration pro-
ceeding."5 The court in Fotochrome reasoned that a bankruptcy,
court had authority to stay an international arbitration only if it
had in personam t 6 jurisdiction over the foreign party.' 7 Be-
11. Id. at 883-84.
12. Id. at 881.
13. Id. at 882.
14. Id. at 885.
15. Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'g 377 F.
Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). Copal, a Japanese corporation, contracted in 1966 to
manufacture cameras for Fotochrome, a Delaware corporation. 517 F.2d at 514.
The contract provided that any dispute arising therefrom would be submitted to the
Japan Commercial Arbitration Association ("JCAA") in Tokyo for final settlement.
Id. A dispute arose, and arbitral proceedings were initiated. Id. During the pen-
dency of these proceedings, Fotochrome filed for bankruptcy and the bankruptcy
court-ordered stay was submitted to the JCAA. Id. The JCAA held the stay to be
ineffective and made an award in favor of Copal. Id. at 515. Initially, the bankruptcy
judge, who was reversed by the district court, 377 F. Supp. at 34, refused to recog-
nize the award, holding: 1) the restraining order had ousted the jurisdiction of the
arbitral tribunal; 2) the bankruptcy referee was not bound by its decision; 3) the
award could not be treated as a final judgment in the bankruptcy proceeding; and
4) the bankruptcy court could reconsider the merits of the underlying dispute. Id.
16. See generally International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
(where a court bases jurisdiction over its authority over the defendant's person, the
action and judgment are "in personam").
17. Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 516-17.
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cause the defendant, a Japanese company, did not have suffi-
cient minimum contacts 8  with the United States, the
Fotochrome court held that it did not have jurisdiction to stay the
arbitration or to void the award because it was rendered after
notification of the stay.' 9 The opinion did not address the is-
sue of whether a U.S. bankruptcy court could stay a foreign
arbitration proceeding if the bankruptcy court did have in per-
sonam jurisdiction.20 Indeed, it specifically skirted the issue.2t
While Fotochrome recognized the importance of enforcing an ar-
bitral award, it provided little insight into the distinction be-
tween the court's power to stay domestic arbitration and its
authority to stay foreign arbitration. The Springer-Penguin court
distinguished its facts from Fotochrome on the ground that the
Yugoslavian arbitration proceeding at issue in Springer-Penguin
had not yet commenced.2 2
In holding that the arbitration should be stayed, Springer-
Penguin cited the Third Circuit's decision in Zimmerman v. Conti-
nental Airlines, Inc. ,23 which interpreted the Code as overriding
U.S. arbitration policies. 24  The Zimmerman court concluded
that the bankruptcy court's power to stay an arbitral proceed-
ing is discretionary. 25 In exercising its discretion, the Springer-
Penguin court cited three factors: (1) the extent to which the
character of the litigation and evidence of the dispute makes a
judicial forum preferable to arbitration; (2) the degree to
which any special expertise is necessary to resolve the dispute;
(3) the arbitrators prior success or failure in settling disputes
between these particular parties. 26 The court reasoned that
because Springer-Penguin's counterclaim for damages would
18. International Shoe provides:
[D]ue process requires . . . that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted).
19. Fotochrone, 517 F.2d at 516.
20. See id. at 520.
21. See id.
22. See Spinger-Penguin, 74 Bankr. at 883.
23. 712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984).
24. 712 F.2d at 59.
25. Id. at 56.
26. Springer-Penguin, 74 Bankr. at 884 (citing In re Double TRL, Inc., 65 Bankr.
993, 998 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (enforcement of contractual arbitration agreement,
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require United States witnesses to travel to Yugoslavia, Jugo's
claim could be more conveniently determined in the bank-
ruptcy court.2 7 The court, therefore, granted Springer-Pen-
guin's motion to enjoinJugo from proceeding with the arbitra-
tion in Yugoslavia and asserted jurisdiction over Jugo's
claims.2 8 This holding is consistent with U.S. bankruptcy poli-
cies.
B. U.S. Bankruptcy Policies
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides procedures for the
liquidation or reorganization of the debtor.2 9 It seeks to en-
in the event of the bankruptcy of one of the parties, was left to the sound discretion
of the bankruptcy judge)).
27. Id. at 884-85.
28. Id. at 885. In granting Springer-Penguin's motion, the court addressed
Jugo's argument that the bankruptcy court permit the arbitration to proceed by ab-
stention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (Supp. III 1985), which provides:
Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law
claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not
arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, with respect to which
an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United States
absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain from
hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adju-
dicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.
Id. The court held this statute inapplicable because, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(B) and (C) (1982), Jugo's claims and Springer-Penguin's counterclaim
are classified as core matters and thus 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) did not apply. Springer-
Penguin, 74 Bankr. at 882. Nor did the court hold that it could exercise its discretion-
ary abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (Supp. Il 1985). Id.
The court also addressedJugo's claim that a prior opinion and order entered in
the district court, directing that the debtor's district court action against Jugo be
stayed pending arbitration, compels denial of debtor's instant application under prin-
ciples ofresjudicata and collateral estoppel. The court held that resjudicata did not
apply, as the issue of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to determine all claims
against the debtor could not have been raised in the prior proceeding, since the
Chapter 11 case had not yet been commenced. Id. at 882-83. Nor was Springer-
Penguin collaterally estopped from seeking a stay, as the parties did not previously
litigate the question of whether all claims against a debtor in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing should require the enjoining of a foreign arbitration. Id. at 883.
29. Pursuant to the Code, a debtor may file for relief through liquidation under
Chapter 7, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-766 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987), or for reorganization
under Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1174 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987), or Chapter
13, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1330 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). Under Chapter 7, the
debtor's nonexempt assets are collected and sold, and the proceeds are distributed to
creditors. See id. §§ 701-766. The principal chapter for commercial purposes is
Chapter 11. under which the debtor submits to the creditors a plan providing for the
adjustment of the debtor's debts and the repayment of creditors, usually from the
future income of the debtor's reconstituted business. See id. §§ 1101-1174.
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sure not only that creditors receive maximum payment but also
that distribution of payments is proportionate among creditors
of similar status.3 °
In reforming the Code in 1978, Congress intended that all
bankruptcy disputes be centralized in the bankruptcy court.3"
The bankruptcy statutes provide that when an entity files for
bankruptcy, jurisdiction over the debtor's assets vests entirely
in the bankruptcy court. 2 Thus, any pending actions against
the debtor are automatically stayed and transferred to the
bankruptcy, court.3 3 The automatic stay applies to each out-
standing litigation and serves to void any unapproved post-pe-
tition awards.3 4 The bankruptcy court can enforce the stay by
imposing contempt sanctions against recalcitrant creditors.3 5
30. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5835; see also Westbrook, The Coming Encounter: International Arbi-
tration and Bankruptcy, 67 MINN. L. REV. 595, 598 (1983).
31. See H.R. REP No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d. sess 1, 52 [hereinafter HouSE RE-
PORT], reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 5976-6000.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 provides in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district
courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title
11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is
commenced shall exercise all the jurisdiction conferred by this section on
the district courts.
28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. III 1985)
33. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1330 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). Section 362, the auto-
matic stay provision, reads in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable
to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title...
11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
34. See generally Westbrook, supra note 30, at 608.
35. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 1306, 1309 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (violations of automatic stay would make creditor in contempt of court and
subject to fine); In re Taco Ed's, Inc., 63 Bankr. 913, 930-31 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986)
(creditor found in contempt of automatic stay provision based on its knowledge of
stay, even though it violated stay on advice of counsel); In re Newman, 53 Bankr. 7, 8
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) (debtor entitled to damages, attorneys fees, and costs
where creditor was in violation of automatic stay). See generally Kennedy, The Automatic
Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 177, 259 (1978).
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The automatic stay is considered one of the fundamental
protections provided by the bankruptcy laws."6 It relieves the
debtor from creditor collection efforts and foreclosure actions,
and permits the debtor to begin a repayment or reorganization
plan." The automatic stay protects creditor interests as well
by prohibiting a creditor from racing to file a claim and ob-
taining payment ahead of other creditors.38
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 expanded the scope
of the automatic stay from staying all "actions" against the
debtor to staying all entities of "a judicial, adminstrative, or
other proceeding against the debtor."3 9 The legislative history
of the act indicates that the stay provision applies to arbitration
proceedings.40 However, the drafters drew no distinction be-
tween international arbitration and domestic arbitration .4
While some courts, such as in Springer-Penguin, have held that
the power to stay a domestic arbitration is discretionary,42
others have respected international arbitration agreements
and have stayed a bankruptcy proceeding pending arbitra-
tion.43
36. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 54-55, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5840-41.
37. Id.
138. Id. at 50-51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5835.
,39. See Transmarittina Sarda Italnavi v. Foremost Ins. Co., 482 F.Supp. 110, 114
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979) (11 U.S.C. § 362 expanded the scope of Bankruptcy Rule
401, where plaintiff argued that an arbitration was not an "action" or "suit" within
the meaning of Rule 401(a)).
40. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6297.
41. See id.
42. See, e.g., In re Frigitemp Corp., 8 Bankr. 284, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (bank-
ruptcy court lifting automatic stay so as to permit arbitration was a proper exercise of
its discretion); In re Valley Kitchens, Inc., 58 Bankr. 6, 9-10 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985)
(bankruptcy court refused to lift automatic stay because Union failed to establish
cause); In re Smith Jones, Inc., 17 Bankr. 126, 128 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (stay modi-
fied to permit continuation of arbitration).
43. See, e.g., In re Mor-Ben Ins. Markets Corp., 73 Bankr. 644, 647 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1987) (fact that bankruptcy court had jurisdiction did not preclude court from
compelling arbitration in light of Arbitration Act); In re Seawest Indus., 73 Bankr.
946, 948-49 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (where it would be contrary to express language of
arbitration agreement, foreign creditor entitled to withdraw its claim and stay coun-
terclaim pending arbitration); Quinn v. CGR, 48 Bankr. 367 (D. Colo. 1985) (grant-
ing French corporation's motion to compel arbitration of dispute with trustee of
debtor); Transmarittina Sarda Italnavi v. Foremost Ins. Co., 482 F. Supp. 110, 113-
15 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against charterer did not
divest an arbitration panel ofjurisdiction to render award against charterer). But cf
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II. THE BEHRING CASE
In Behring," the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal re-
fused to stay arbitration proceedings between Behring Interna-
tional, Inc., a freight forwarding company, and the Imperial
Iranian Air Force (Iranian Air Force) after Behring filed a peti-
tion in bankruptcy.45 The Tribunal, pursuant to the Algiers
Accords,46 has jurisdiction over all disputes between the U.S.
or U.S. nationals and Iran or Iranian nationals that arose as a
result of the hostage crisis.47 Thus, the Tribunal viewed the
Cunard Steamship Company v. Salen Reefer Serv., 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985)
(granting comity to Swedish bankruptcy court's stay by vacating English corpora-
tion's attachment of entity's assets in U.S.).
44. No. ITM/ITL 52-382-3, slip op. (Iran-United States Claims Tribunal June
21, 1985).
45. Id. at 28-30.
46. See infra note 47.
47. On November 3, 1979 Iranian militants seized control of the United States
Embassy in Tehran, taking fifty-three American diplomatic and consular staff mem-
bers hostage. This hostage crisis lasted for more than one year. See generally W.
CHRISTOPHER, AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN (1985); Note, Algerian Intervention in the
Iranian Hostage Crisis, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 259, 260 (1984).
During this time the Iranian government breached many contracts with private
companies in the United States. See W. CHRISTOPHER, supra, at 174; Stewart & Sher-
man, Developments at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. 1981-1983, 24 VA.J. INT'L L.
1, 2 (1983). Iran also announced that it was withdrawing all assets from the United
States and that it was expropriating American investments in Iran. W. CHRISTOPHER,
supra, at 176; Stewart & Sherman, supra, at 2. In response, the United States Govern-
ment, by presidential order, froze all Iranian assets in the United States and abroad.
Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,279 (1979); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982);
Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.101 (1986). A substantial
number of these frozen Iranian assets were attached by United States judicial pro-
ceedings. See Note, Preudgment Attachment of Frozen Iranian Assets, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
837 (1981).
Although the focus of United States negotiators was on the safe return of the
hostages, resolution of these private contractual claims against Iran, and the return
of frozen Iranian assets, became critical in resolving the crisis. Stewart & Sherman,
supra, at 3. A solution was reached inJanuary 1981 as a result of the Algiers Accords.
81 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1 (Feb. 1981), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981). The Accords
consisted of two declarations, the Undertakings of the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to
the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Alge-
ria, 81 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 4, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 223, 234 (1981), and the Techni-
cal Arrangement between the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, the Bank of England, and
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1981). Id. The President's authority to enter
into and carry out the agreements with Iran was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). The first General Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria provided for the
release of the hostages in return for, inter alia, nullification of United States attach-
ment of Iranian assets and the transfer of these assets to a Security Account. See
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stay as a violation of its own jurisdiction.4 8
A. Behring's Claim
Behring had entered into a contract with the Iranian Air
Force in August 1975.49 Pursuant to the contract, Behring ar-
ranged to take delivery of goods purchased by the Iranian Air
Force and store them at its warehouse in New Jersey. 50 Beh-
ring paid shipping and related expenses in moving the goods
in preparation for shipment to Iran.5 t
In 1979, as a result of the political turmoil in Iran,52 the
Iranian Air Force's representative left New York and Behring's
representatives were forced to leave Iran.5- The Iranian Air
Force refused to make any payments for the shipments that re-
mained uncollected at Behring's warehouse.5 4 Behring com-
menced an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey to recover warehousing charges, 55 but these pro-
ceedings were superseded by the establishment of the Tribu-
nal. 6
While the arbitration was pending before the Tribunal,
Behring filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in a Texas.
bankruptcy court.57 Behring then sent a communication to the
Tribunal stating that all its proceedings were automatically
Stewart & Sherman, supra, at 4. Since Iranian assets had been attached, "a simple
lifting of the freeze on Iranian assets would not have resulted in the return of those
assets to Iran." Id. at 3. Therefore, the second Agreement, the Claims Settlement
Agreement, Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic
of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 81 DEP'T
STATE BuLL. at 3, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 223, 230 (1981), was drafted, which estab-
lished a new international arbitral body, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,
which divested United States courts of jurisdiction in claims between United States
nationals and the government of Iran. It is before this Tribunal that these claims
were to be resolved.
48. Behring, supra note 7, at 29.
49. Id. at 16.
50. Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 386
(D.NJ. 1979), aff'd, 699 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1983).
51. d.
52. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
53. Behring, 475 F. Supp. at 387.
54. d. at 386.
55. Id. at 387.
56. Behring, 699 F.2d at 666.
57. See In re Behring Int'l Inc., 61 Bankr. 896, 897 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
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stayed pursuant to the Code. 8
B. The Tribunal's Ruling
The Tribunal held that it was not bound by the Bank-
ruptcy Code's automatic stay provision.59 It noted that neither
the Algiers Accords nor the Tribunal Rules6° indicate that Tri-
bunal proceedings can be regulated by the national law of
either the United States or Iran.6 t
The thrust of the Tribunal's decision was that principles of
neutrality would be violated if U.S. or Iranian national law in-
truded upon the arbitration proceeding. 62 The Tribunal rea-
soned that, given the tenuous political situation from which the
Tribunal was created, "the very purpose of establishing the
Tribunal was to remove certain claims from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the States Parties to this international forum."6
The Tribunal also relied on the Second Circuit's decision
in Fotochrome 4 in reasoning that, because Iran lacked current
minimum contacts with the United States, the bankruptcy
court did not have in personam jurisdiction over the foreign
defendant. 65 However, the authority given to the Tribunal by
the Algiers Accords renders a Fotochrome analysis irrelevant.
The Tribunal was created specifically to divest the United
States and Iranian courts of jurisdiction over claims that arose
during the hostage crisis regardless ofjurisdiction. 66 Thus any
attempt to stay these proceedings violated the spirit of the Al-
giers Accords.6 7
III INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SHOULD BE
STATUTORILY EXCLUDED FROM THE
AUTOMATIC STAY
The Tribunal premised its holding on the unique jurisdic-
58. Behring, supra note 7, at 28.





64. 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
65. Behring, supra note 7, at 29-30.
66. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
67. See Behring, supra note 7, at 29.
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tion granted to it by the Algiers Accords." However, denial of
the automatic stay should be universal to all international arbi-
tration so as to warrant the exemption of international arbitra-
tion proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code.69 The interests
involved in promoting international commerce dictate that pri-
vate agreements to arbitrate between international parties be
enforced and accorded the same degree of independence as is
maintained by the Tribunal. °
A. Neutrality of Arbitration Proceedings
Despite the fact that advantages of speed and economy as-
sociated with domestic arbitration are lost in an international
context,7 ' the growth in international trade and investment has
led to a concurrent increase in the number of contracts that
contain arbitration provisions.7 2 Arbitration clauses are a de-
liberate relinquishment by the parties of the potential advan-
tage of litigating in their national courts. 73 Thus, arbitration
serves to foster profitable relationships by resolving disputes
in a way that both parties regard as fair. 4 Furthermore, in a
situation where a national government is inextricably linked to
the contract, arbitration avoids the possibility of favoritism in
that state's courts. 75
It is a basic assumption that parties to an international
contract who choose arbitration as a means of settling disputes
rely on the neutrality of the arbitral forum.76 The principle of
neutrality is especially important with regard to international
68. Id.
69. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987) (enumerates proceed-
ings that are not affected by the automatic stay).
70. Cf. infra notes 71-98 and accompanying text.
71. See A. REDFERN & M. HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION 18 (1986); Higgins, Brown & Roach, Pitfalls in International
Commercial Arbitration, 35 Bus. LAW. 1035, 1036 (1980).
72. See de Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for Na-
tional Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42, 45-46 (1982).
73. Higgins, Brown & Roach, supra note 71, at 1036.
74. See Cloud, Mitsubishi and the Arbitrability of Anitirust Claims: Did the Supreme
Court Throw the Baby Out With the Bath Water?, 18 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 341, 342
(1986).
75. A. REDFERN & M. HUNTER, supra note 71, at 20.
76. See generally Goekjian, ICC Arbitration from a Practitioner's Perspective, 14J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 407, 430-34 (1980); Goekjian, The Conduct of International Arbitration, II
LAw AM. 409, 410-411 (1979).
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transactions because inconsistencies among the laws of differ-
ent countries are potentially much more prejudicial than in a
domestic context.77 Thus, the neutrality of the arbitration is
always a major consideration. If the parties specify that partic-
ular substantive and procedural laws are to apply, they have
expressed their intent to exclude all others from intruding on
the proceeding. 78
B. Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
United States recognition and enforcement of arbitration
agreements has never been stronger.79 The United States' ac-
cession to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards ("Convention") in
1970,80 as well as the 1970 revision of the United States Arbi-
tration Act,8 ' began a trend in favor of enforcement of interna-
tional arbitration agreements. 82 The Supreme Court has up-
held arbitration clauses in international contracts even when
there is a strong conflicting domestic issue at stake.8 '
This policy favoring arbitration was recently reinforced in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.8 4 In this
case the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
U.S. antitrust claim would be arbitrable between Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, a Puerto Rican corporation, and Mitsub-
ishi, a Japanese corporation.85 After finding that a valid agree-
ment to arbitrate existed, 6 the Court held that the antitrust
claim was a proper claim to arbitrate "even assuming that a
contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context."8 7
The Court noted that questions of arbitrability of a claim
77. See de Vries, supra, note 72 at 46-47.
78. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (C. Brower & L.
Marks co-chairman 1983).
79. See infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
80. See Convention, supra note 3, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 3.
81. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1982).
82. See infra notes 84-98 and accompanying text; see also Note, Application of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 8 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 194 (1985).
83. See infra notes 84-98.
84. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
85. Id. at 616-17.
86. Id. at 626-28.
87. Id. at 629.
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should be resolved in favor of arbitration."8 Further, where a
party has agreed to be bound by an arbitration clause, it will
not be held unenforceable because the underlying claim is
founded on a statutory right.8 9 "We cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets and international waters exclu-
sively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our
courts." 90 The Court found that the complexity of the claim
would not be a sufficient reason to deny arbitration.9 Further-
more, absent express congressional intent to the contrary, the
substantive protection afforded by the antitrust laws could not
be read as a waiver of the right of the parties to choose a judi-
cial forum.9" Thus, the Mitsubishi decision confirms an "em-
phatic federal policy" favoring arbitration.93
The Mitsubishi Court relied on its previous decision in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. ,9 which involved the arbitrability of
a claim under U.S. federal securities laws. 95 The Court in
Scherk held the claim was arbitrable in an international setting
even though the subject matter would not have been arbitrable
in a domestic context.96 The Court noted that sufficient uncer-
tainty as to the applicable law existed at the time of the making
of the contract to warrant drafting an arbitration clause.9"
And, because such potential uncertainty will exist with regard
to any international contract, the Court viewed the arbitration
clause as an "almost indispensable precondition to achieve-
ment of the orderliness and predictability essential to any in-
ternational business transaction."98
Springer-Penguin's failure to follow the reasoning in Mitsub-
ishi renders its analysis innaccurate. Although the Springer-Pen-
guin court stressed the importance that the United States has
placed on international arbitration,99 it abandoned this line of
88. Id. at 626 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
89. Id. at 626.
90. Id. at 629 (citing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972)).
91. Id. at 633.
92. Id. at 628.
93. Id. at 63 1.
94. 417 U.S. 506 (1973), reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
95. Id. at 509-10.
96. Id. at 513-15.
97. Id. at 516.
98. Id. at 516.
99. Springer-Penquin, 74 Bankr. at 881-82.
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reasoning in its analysis of the conflicting bankruptcy poli-
cies.' 0 0
The Springer-Penguin court cited Zimmerman to support its
contention that the Code impliedly modifies the Arbitration
Act, 1 1 thereby granting bankruptcy judges the discretion to
stay arbitral proceedings.' 0 2 Zimmerman, however, involved a
domestic arbitration clause.'0 3 In contrast, the Supreme Court
in Scherk held that because of their importance to international
commerce, international arbitration clauses would be enforced
where domestic arbitration clauses would not. 0 4 Therefore,
Springer-Penguin's reliance on the Zimmerman analysis is incor-
rect.
The only case that the Springer-Penguin court cited that in-
volved an international arbitration clause is clearly distinguish-
able. The court relied on In re Braniff,'0 5 which denied a mo-
tion to compel arbitration between a debtor and a foreign de-
fendant.'0 6 The bankruptcy court held that the issues sought
to be arbitrated rendered arbitration unworkable from a prac-
tical standpoint. 0 7 Because the debtor, had tried unsuccess-
fully for a year to reorganize, the court reasoned that resorting
to arbitration at this stage would result in such added delay
that both the debtor and all of his creditors would be denied
the fruits of a complete reorganization. 0  Given the Supreme
Court's language in Mitsubishi that "[t]here is no reason to de-
part from [an agreement to arbitrate] where a party bound by
an arbitration agreement raises claims founded on statutory
rights,"' 0 9 the substantive goal of reorganization of the
Code 1 0 would not have been a justification for the bankruptcy
100. Id. at 883-85.
101. Id. at 883-84.
102. Id.
103. Zimmerman 712 F.2d at 56.
104. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513-16 (1973), reh 'g denied, 419
U.S. 885 (1974).
105. 33 Bankr. 33 (Bankr. N.D. Tex 1983)
106. Id.
107. Id. at 36.
108. Id.
109. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626 (1985)
110. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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court to stay the arbitration proceeding."'I Additionally, pur-
suant to the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Arbitral Awards," 2 the issues sought to be arbitrated
in Braniff were beyond the scope of the arbitration clause be-
cause they would be determinative of which creditors would
share in the debtor's estate." 53 By contrast, in Springer-Penguin,
the court clearly stated that the arbitration clause was enforce-
able." 4
C. Creditor Protection
The Code does contain a provision that protects creditors
from receiving a disproportionate payment because of a judg-
ment rendered in a foreign proceeding." 5 The statute pro-
vides that where a foreign creditor receives a judgment on a
claim, he may not receive payment on that claim until each of
the debtor's other creditors receives payment equal in value to
that received by the foreign creditor." 6 Therefore, allowing
an arbitration to proceed cannot be viewed as giving an unfair
advantage to foreign creditors.
D. Debtor Protection
Debtors should receive protection under the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards,
which imposes a requirement of procedural due process as a
prerequisite to enforcing an award." 7 Article V(I)(b) of the
111. Cf. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626 (1985)
112. Convention, supra note 3.
113. In re Braniff, 33 Bankr. 33, 35-36 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
114. Springer-Penquin, at 881.
115. 11 U.S.C. § 508(a) (1982) provides:
If a creditor receives, in a foreign proceeding, payment of, or a transfer of
property on account of, a claim that is allowed under this title, such creditor
may not receive any payment under this title on account of such claim until
each of the other holders of claims on account of which such holders are
entited to share equally with such creditor under this title has recieved pay-
ment under this title equal in value to the consideration received by such
creditor in such foreign proceeding.
Id.
116. Id.
117. Convention, supra note 3, art. V(l)(b), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520, T.I.A.S. No.
6997, at 4, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 42. "This provision essentially sanctions the application
of the forum state's standards of due process." Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co.
v. Societe Generale de l'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Convention provides that an enforcing court may refuse to rec-
ognize an award under two circumstances: first, where the
party did not receive proper notice of the proceeding; or, sec-
ond, where the party lacked an opportunity to present his
case."1 ' This second requirement would protect a debtor from
having an award enforced against him, if, because of his bank-
ruptcy, he lacks the resources to adequately represent himself
in an arbitration. If such a situation were to occur, a debtor
could contest the enforcement of a default award made against
him under this provision of the Convention.' 9
118. Convention, supra note 3, art. V(l)(b), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520, T.I.A.S. No.
6997, at 4, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 42.
119. This procedural due process defense has thus far been construed narrowly
by U.S. courts. See generally McClendon, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the
United States, 4 Nw.J. Irr'L L. & Bus. 58, 64 (1982); Note, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards Under the United Nations Convention of 1958: A Survey of Recent Federal Case Law,
11 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 13, 29 (1987); Comment, The Federal Courts and the Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 5 PACE L. REV. 151, 164 (1984).
In Parsons & Whittemore, the Second Circuit enforced an arbitral award over plain-
tiff's assertion that the arbitral tribunal's refusal to delay its proceedings to hear one
witness was a violation of due process under art. V(l)(b) of the Convention. 508
F.2d at 975. The court reasoned that inability to produce one witness is a "risk inher-
ent in an agreement to submit to arbitration." Id. Furthermore, because the witness
was unable to testify due to a prior lecturing commitment, the Parsons & Whittemore
court held that this was "hardly the type of obstacle ... which would require the
arbitral tribunal to postpone the hearing as a matter of fundamental fairness to
[plaintiff]." Id. The court also noted that the arbitral tribunal did hear and consider
other evidence and had the missing witness's affidavit which furnished much of the
information to which he would have testified. Id. at 976.
In Biotronik Mess-und Therapiege GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument
Co., 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976), the court held the due process provision of the
Convention inapplicable where defendant offered no explanation for its failure to
present its case other than the fact that it was waiting for an agreement to expire in
order to determine its rights and liabilities thereunder. Id. at 140. The court stated
that the defendant could have offered a copy of the agreement, or any other extrinsic
evidence, to support its position. Id. at 141.
In Parsons & Whittemore, the art. V(1)(b) due process defense was not successful
because the court held that the absense of one of plaintiff's witnesses did not consti-
tute a failure of Plaintiff to adequately present his case. 508 F.2d at 975-76. If a
debtor was unable to arbitrate, and it were more than a matter of one witness being
unable to testify, the debtor should be able to contest enforcement of an award based
on art. V(I)(b) due process grounds.
In Biotronik the court held that the defendant did not adequately explain its fail-
ure to participate in the arbitration. 415 F. Supp. at 140. Arguably, a debtor's peti-
tion in bankruptcy, coupled with the trustee in bankruptcy's testimony that it was
financially unfeasible for the debtor to arbitrate, would seem to be an adequate ex-
planation of the debtor's failure to participate in the arbitration so as to be sufficient
to assert the art. V(l)(b) due process defense.
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E. Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
Allowing an international arbitration to proceed despite
the filing of a bankruptcy petition by one of the parties would
not contradict the intentions of the legislators who drafted the
Bankruptcy Reform Act. The legislative history of the auto-
matic stay provision indicates that its drafters believed that it
will sometimes be more appropriate to continue an action
where it was commenced "in order to leave the parties to their
chosen forum and to relieve the bankruptcy court from many
duties that may be handled elsewhere."' 20 However, the legis-
lative history also suggests that the stay will still issue, and that
the opposing party must seek relief from the stay in the bank-
ruptcy court' 2 ' to provide the trustee an adequate opportunity
to inventory the debtor's financial situation.' 22 Arguably, the
trustee could take account of an arbitration in determining the
debtor's financial status without having to stay the proceeding.
CONCLUSION
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, in Behring, cor-
rectly refused to stay its arbitration proceeding. In light of re-
cent U.S. policy, as enunciated in Mitsubishi, which supports en-
forcement of arbitration clauses, allowing the arbitration to
proceed comports with the intentions of the parties, and fos-
ters international commerce. The interests in preserving the
neutrality of international commercial arbitration should over-
ride the automatic stay provision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
U.S. debtors, as well as creditors, are sufficiently protected by
other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as by the Arti-
cle V(1)(b) of the U.N. Convention. Therefore, international
arbitration should be excluded from the automatic stay provi-
sion of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
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